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INTRODUCTION

Donald Trump has brought new attention to the mendacity of politicians. Both major national newspapers have reported tallies of
Trump's false and misleading claims.1 On November 14, 2017, The
Washington Post reported that in the 298 days that President
Trump has been president, he had made 1,628 false or misleading
claims, telling them at a rate of nine per day in the thirty-five days
* Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Philosophy, by courtesy, Georgetown
University Law Center. This article is based on a presentation I gave as part of the Resurrecting Truth in American Law and Public Discourse Symposium, held at Duquesne University School of Law in November 2017. I am indebted to Bruce Ledewitz, who invited me to
co-convene that event and whose constructive, engaged approach to scholarship and community brought out the best in all the participants. Associate Dean Jane Campbell Moriarty
fully supported and helped shape the symposium. Jill Chadwick made the logistics flawless.
Colleen Derda ensured that the event was fully publicized. The efforts of these Duquesne
faculty and administrators made the Truth Symposium a success. I thank the audience and
my fellow symposiasts for engagement with my presentation and the theme of the symposium. Discussion with Louise Antony, Bruce Ledewitz, Justin Dyer, Larry Solan, Alina Ng,
Brad Wendel, and Wilson Huhn helped me hone my ideas. I also thank my research assistant, Anna Faber, for serving as sounding board, source finder, and cite-checker, and the
staff of the Duquesne Law Review for assistance in readying the article for publication.
1. In 365 Days, President Trump Has Made 2,140 False or Misleading Claims, WASH.
POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database/?utmterm=.b22a8f3a6c87 (last updated Jan. 19, 2018); David Leonhardt & Stuart A.
Thompson, Trump's Lies, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.html.
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prior to November 14.2 Trump, the Post reported, has made fifty
false or misleading claims "that he as repeated three or more
times." 3 The Post also catalogued scores of "flip-flops" from Trump. 4
In general, from 2016 into 2017, journalistic political fact-checking
has surged in frequency and scope. 5 Newspapers and magazines
regularly run articles, columns, and features on Trump's recordbreaking lying.6
Though the frequency and blatancy with which Trump lies is exceptional, he is not the only elected political leader active today
whose mendacity has been documented.
Catalogues exist for
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, Vice President Mike Pence, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Senate Minority Leader
Chuck Schumer, and Senate Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi.7
Trump cabinet members and White House spokespeople have also
come under scrutiny for their untruthfulness. 8
2.

Glen Kessler, Meg Kelly & Nicole Lewis, President Trump Has Made 1,628 False or

Misleading Claims Over 298 Days, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/201 7/11/14/president-trump-has-made- 1628-false-or-mis-

leading-claims-over-298-days/?utmterm=.a34199e1d252.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Alexios Mantzarlis, How Has Political Fact-CheckingChanged After Trump's First
100 Days? Not Much., POYNTER (May 1, 2017), https://www.poynter.org/news/how-has-political-fact-checking-changed-after-trumps-first- 100-days-not-much.
6. Glenn Kessler & Meg Kelly, President Trump Has Made More Than 2,000 False or

Misleading Claims over 355 Days, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/01/1 0/president-trump-has-made-more-than-2000-

false-or-misleading-claims-over-355-days/?utmterm=.8f8332107dl6;

David Leonhardt, Jan

Prasad Philbrick & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump's Lies us. Obama's, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/14/opinion/sunday/trump-lies-obamawho-is-worse.html (comparing Trump and Obama as to "demonstrably and substantially
false statements" without counting repeated mentions of same lie, and showing that, in the
first ten months of his presidency, Trump told six times the number of lies Obama told during
his entire two terms of office); see also Bella DePaulo, IStudy Liars. I've Never Seen One Like
President Trump, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlooklistudy-liars-ive-never-seen-one-like-president-trump/2017/12/07/4e529efe-da3f-11e7-a841-

2066faf73lef story.html?utmterm=.b6bf3f09119f; Lauren Duca, Gaslighting 2: Revenge of
the Reality-Based Community, TEENVOGUE (Nov. 9,2017, 10:31 AM EST), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/gaslighting-2-revenge-of-the-reality-based-community;
Sean Illing, "The
Fish Rots from the Head": A Historianon the Unique Corruption of Trump's White House,
VOX, https://www.vox.com/2017/11/16/16643614/trump-administration-corruption-russia-in-

vestigation (last updated Mar. 1, 2018, 9:53 AM EST).
7. Venues covering these politicians include POLITIFACT, www.politifact.com; SNOPES,
https://snopes.com; and FACTCHECK, https://www.factcheck.org.
8. Dan Alexander, The Case of Wilbur Ross'Phantom $2 Billion, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2017,
6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2017/11/07/the-case-of-wilbur-ross-

phantom-2-billion/; Igor Bobic, The First 100 Lies: The Trump Team's Flurry of Falsehoods,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 26, 2017, 9:44 AM EST), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-administration-lies-100_us_58ac7aofe4bo2ale7dac3ca6; Chris Cillizza, Donald
Trump
Just
Keeps
Lying,
CNN
(Aug.
3,
2017,
7:41
AM
EST),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/donald-trump-mexico-boy-scouts-lies/index.html;
Leigh Cuen & Politifact, 4 Times Trump and His Cabinet Have Lied About Immigration,
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Clearly, not all mendacity is of equal concern. Some mendacity
is not even troubling at all. Small white lies told to protect another's feelings about a trivial matter are at one end of the scale,
while serial deception to defraud investors out of their life savings
or to sustain two families, each kept secret from the other, are at
another. Similarly, political hype or bluster may not be troublesome, whereas lying about criminal activity or scientific fact seems
clearly so. Most political mendacity falls into a middle ground. Understanding when and how middle-ground mendacity is dangerously harmful is crucial. Decrying all mendacity is overkill, yet narrowing the field is difficult. Press tallies and online databases vary
in what they count as lies. Entries run the gamut of fibs to whoppers, fudges to half-truths or falsehoods. Yet even calibrated catalogues of mendacious statements from politicians do not identify
when and how mendacity from politicians should alarm us. Factcheckers spot mendacity and sometimes put it on a scale of deceptiveness, but this is not the same as identifying harmful mendacity.
With mendacity in politics receiving so much attention, it is important to figure out which mendacity is dangerous and why. Lawyers, I will demonstrate, have a particular expertise in parsing
mendacity. They can and should put that expertise to use in identifying the political mendacity that is particularly problematic for
the health of representative democracy.
II.

THE LAW'S APPROACH TO MENDACITY: A CASE STUDY

When non-lawyers think of the law's concern with dishonesty,
they naturally think of perjury or lying under oath in a formal legal
proceeding, such as a trial or congressional hearing. But the law of
perjury is not the locus of the most robust and nuanced legal doctrines and codes that deal with mendacity. Mendacity in marketplaces receives far more legal scrutiny than lying under oath, for
example. Many different areas of law address truthfulness and dishonesty in marketplaces: the common law of tort and contract; state
TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 16, 2017, 8:00 AM EST), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/trump-lies-immigration; Pema Levy & Dan Friedman, 3 Times Jeff Sessions Made False Statements to
Congress Under Oath, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 8, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/11/3-times-jeff-sessions-made-false-statements-to-congress-underoath/; Chris Strohm & Billy House, Sessions Says He Forgot About Russia Meeting But Didn't
Lie, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2017, 10:32 AM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017- 11- 14/sessions-says-he-s-never-lied-about-russia-trump-connections;
Eric Umansky & Marcelo Rochabrun, 5 Trump Cabinet Members Who've Made False Statements to Con-

gress, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 2, 2017, 6:36 PM EST), https://www.propublica.org/article/fivetrump-cabinet-members-made-false-statements-to-congress
(noting lies during the confirmation hearings of Scott Pruitt, Betsy DeVos, Steve Mnuchin, Tom Price, and Jeff Sessions).
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statutory codifications applicable specifically to merchants; federal
laws dealing with the sales of securities; and state consumer protection laws, to name but some. Only a small proportion of doctrine
in each of these areas relates to straight up lying or knowing expression of falsehood with an intent to deceive. Instead, much doctrine focuses on misleading or deceptive practices, not isolated
statements whose description depends on knowledge of the intent
of the speaker. Other doctrine attempts to limit deception by requiring precision in communication and content. And much that
might be considered mendacious is not prohibited by law, even in
settings where the law bans some mendacity: not all mendacity
harmfully compromises markets, and the law does not attend to
mendacity for its own sake. Only certain kinds of mendacity in specific contexts has the capacity to corrode a market's operations.
Law attempts to pinpoint these instances so as to regulate them. I
definitely do not and would not recommend the promulgation of new
law for regulating political mendacity; however, examining what
the law pinpoints as problematic mendacity in the context of markets illuminates both the sort of mendacity problematic in politics
and why lawyers with even modest training or education about
market-threatening mendacity are likely to be good at spotting the
kinds of mendacity that threaten American representative democracy.
It is useful to consider why the law regulating mendacity in markets is so extensive. What is it about markets that provokes mendacity? Why has American law ended up replete with doctrines to
redress the problem?
Adam Smith may well have been right that as social creatures,
people are literally born with a disposition "to truck, barter, and
exchange," 9 but that disposition alone does not give rise to a functioning market. Ongoing commercial activity requires that buyers
and sellers trust one another in the transactional setting or else
they will not be willing to engage there. On a very small scale, in
hyper-local markets, people can draw on their common sense to
evaluate each other's truthfulness in transactions, although even in
comparatively small settings, participants quickly augment common sense with other means of verification-such as with public
scales, for example. 10

9.

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

15 (Edwin Cannan ed., Metheun & Co. 1904) (1776).
10. Public scales, meant to ensure honesty in transactions, have a long history in North
America. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO. FROM
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In markets where transactions are generally arms-length and inperson evaluation of a buyer's or seller's truthfulness is generally
impossible, mendacity occurs more often. It emerges because people are both social and self-interested. Self-interest drives us to
make ourselves better off; sociability inclines us to trust one another. When an activity can serve self-interest by capitalizing on
others' credulousness, conditions are ripe for mendacity. In these
contexts, mendacity is a kind of predation and exploitation: it
harms or wrongfully uses others to further the interests or goals of
the mendacious one. This predatory or exploitative conduct can be
objected to on deontological or aretaic grounds. A deontologist may
urge that respect for human dignity makes exploitation, via mendacity or any other mechanism, wrong. A virtue theorist may argue
that mendaciousness is inconsistent with epistemic excellence. But
legal intervention in mendacity in markets is probably provoked by
a more consequentialist consideration: American law favors the existence of markets, and markets cannot expand and operate efficiently if they are riddled with mendacity.
American law particularly promotes the existence and large
scope of markets for mass-produced consumer goods-goods manufactured by large scale producers and sold to many individuals
throughout a state, region, or even the entire country. The volume
of goods made and sold, the distance between manufacturer and end
consumer, the string of middlemen typically involved in distribution, and the very flourishing of markets for consumer goods make
them simultaneously ripe for mendacity on the part of sellers (manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers) but vulnerable to too much
mendacity. Sellers know there are numerous consumers, each of
whom makes many purchases. They also know that consumers
have scarce time and opportunity for face-to-face, common-sense
evaluations of sellers' truthfulness or even to gather secondhand
reputational information about sellers' truthfulness. This creates
the opportunity for seller mendacity at the expense of consumers.
But of course, the more sellers who act mendaciously toward consumers, the less willing or eager people will be to purchase massproduced goods. Shrinking demand tends to diminish supply.
Eventually, pervasive mendacity can undermine a market's very

JANUARY 1, 1885, TO DECEMBER 31, 1885, 1337 (1886) (discussing the establishment of a public scale on city property by the Merchants Exchange, defining "public scale," and noting such
scales' prevalence in "eastern cities"); MINUTES OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

PHILADELPHIA. 1704 TO 1776. 786-87 (1847) (resolving to immediately construct "public
Scales for weighing of Hay" at the "Meal Market" so that "Country people" would be protected
from "Hucksters of Meal").
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existence. Sellers face a collective action problem: the collective
level of truthfulness required is high, but the individual seller incentive to be mendacious is also high. Consumers face a trust problem: unless mendacity among sellers is overall relatively low, they
have no reason to trust-or risk purchasing from-any given seller.
It is important to note that the problem here is with the quality
of information about goods and especially about the terms on which
they are being sold. If the problem were only about the quality of
the goods themselves, personal experience with the goods would
give consumers reason, or not, to continue to buy from particular
sellers. For potential purchasers, the difficulty is knowing whether
sellers are giving them accurate information about quality, content,
and terms of sale with regard to any specific future transaction.
Even explicit warranties and guarantees cannot resolve the problem of possible mendacity. These instruments themselves can be
vehicles of mendacity, and individual sellers have the same incentives to use them mendaciously as they have to be mendacious
about goods themselves, even if all sellers would be better off if none
were mendacious about either.
Laws and regulations governing false and misleading advertising
take direct aim at the problem of reducing mendacity in the market
for consumer goods. By focusing on advertising, these laws take
advantage of a necessary activity for sellers in a crowded, robust
market: informing potential customers, who have other opportunities, of the existence and merit of the option provided by a particular
seller. Sellers advertise to gain attention for their products and
sales venues and to inform potential buyers about the comparative
advantages of both. Consumer protection law related to false and
misleading advertising capitalizes on sellers' felt need to advertise
in the first place.
In the United States, much consumer protection law is state law.
To show how a state curtails false or misleading advertising, I consider a small portion of California law: California's regulation of advertising of home furnishings. In addition to its statutory law pursuant to false or misleading advertising, California has an administrative code of regulations to address the phenomenon. Within
that code, there is an entire division that sets up the Bureau of Electronic and Appliance Repair, Home Furnishings and Thermal Insulation (Bureau of Home Furnishings)," created by the authority of
the Home Furnishings Act. 12 Among its other activities, the Bureau
11.
12.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4 § 1101 (2018).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19034 (2018).

Summer 2018

Political Mendacity

131

of Home Furnishings enforces an article of the California administrative code that pertains to false and misleading advertising, 13 and
it is this article's sections that convey the highly contextualized and
particularized approach California takes in this area.
The regulations start with a definition of falsity or misleadingness.
In determining whether advertising is false or misleading it shall
be considered in its entirety and as it would be read by the persons
to whom it is designed to appeal. It shall be considered to be misleading if it tends to deceive the public or impose upon credulous or
ignorant persons. 14
Several features of this definition are particularly salient. First,
the regulation does not belabor distinctions between falsity, misleadingness, and deception. Second, it requires no information
about the intent of the advertiser, instead approaching the question
of an advertisement's meaning entirely from the perspective of the
targeted audience. Third, it evaluates deceptiveness from the vantage point of both the general public and a slice of it: those who are
"credulous" or ignorant.
The article then turns to very specific practices, noted and dealt
with in precise yet colloquial terms. For example, consider this section on "Bait and Switch Advertising":
The term "Bait and Switch Advertising" means an alluring but
insincere offer to sell a product or service which the advertiser
in truth does not intend or want to sell. The purpose thereof is
to switch consumers from buying the advertised merchandise,
in order to sell something else, usually at a higher price or on
a basis more advantageous to the advertiser. Bait and switch
advertising of any article subject to the provisions of the Home
Furnishings Act shall be deemed to be false and misleading.
Practices which shall be considered as evidence of unlawful
bait and switch advertising include but are not limited to the
following:
(a) Refusal to show the product advertised;
(b) Disparagement in any respect of the advertised product
or the terms of sale;

13.
14.

Id. § 19150. These regulations are promulgated pursuant to section 17500.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4 § 1300.1 (2018).
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(c) Failure to have available at all outlets listed in the advertisement sufficient quantities of the product to meet
reasonable anticipated demands;
(d) Refusal to take orders for the advertised merchandise
for delivery within a reasonable period;
(e) Showing or demonstrating a defective product unusable
or impractical for the purposes implied in the advertisement;
(f) Accepting a deposit for the product and then switching
the purchaser to a higher priced item;
(g) Failure to make deliveries within a reasonable time or
to make a refund. 15
This section does include a reference to the seller's intentions. It
does not, however, rely on these as evidence of an "alluring but insincere offer" meant to entice customers, but to get them to buy
something different. A concrete set of practices, listed in clauses
(a)-(g), shows how bait and switch is done. These practices, not the
inner mental states of the seller, evidence bait and switch.
The article also has a section dedicated to ads about factory outlets. That section insists that when an ad refers to a "factory outlet"
or a "factory store":
such terms shall not be used in any advertisement, sign, or by
any other device or printed material unless the establishment
is owned in its entirety by the factory and the factory is responsible for its operation, function, and pay of the employees and
unless a minimum of 51 percent in dollar volume of the articles
of furniture and bedding sold or offered for sale are manufactured by the factory.16
This might seem oddly tautological if one did not know that, in
contemporary America, manufacturers commonly operate stores in
exurban malls devoted exclusively to so-called factory outlets-attracting people to these inconvenient (for the shopper) but low-rent
(for the manufacturer) locations by suggesting that deals are to be
had by cutting out the usual middlemen. Indeed, the article goes
on to provisions regulating use of terms like "'Factory Direct,' 'Factory to You,' 'Manufacturer to You,' [and] 'Direct to You,"' requiring
15.
16.

Id. § 1304.1.
Id. § 1309.

Summer 2018

Political Mendacity

133

that these must refer to transactions where the factory bills the consumer, and the consumer's payment directly goes to the factory.1 7
These regulations tackle advertising that raises the bait and switch
specter in a very specific manner. The "factory outlet" and "factory
direct" regulations guard against a highly contextual practice that
could easily "deceive the public or impose upon credulous or ignorant persons" by taking advantage of contemporary American consumer assumptions about wholesale and retail selling of consumer
goods-assumptions that may be largely tacit or implicit, not entirely conscious to consumers themselves.
There are additional regulations directed against advertising
goods as "Custom Made" (an article must be made to specifications
for a particular customer and noting an article does not count
"merely because the customer has a choice of coverings")18 and prohibiting advertising a sale as "Going Out of Business" unless the
business is indeed winding down (merchandise must already be on
premises or previously ordered and "mere change of business location, business name, or type of business entity" does not count). 19
All in all, California's statutes and regulations regarding false
advertising of home furnishings display a remarkable degree of particularity and reach. This combination is the hallmark of a method
that identifies problematic mendacity so as to prevent it. By incorporating context, the regulations pinpoint how mendacity is practiced. Then, the practices themselves can be banned or used to identify prohibited communications. Neither the statutes nor the regulations focus on the intentional states of sellers. Enforcement does
not require a determination of whether a seller is straight up lying,
carelessly misinforming, or somewhere in between these poles. Instead, the focus is on practices that indicate the promulgation of
inaccurate information, particularly inaccurate information likely
to exploit buyers in order to benefit, at least in the short term, those
who purvey it. Applying the regulations requires detection of practices such as bait and switch, improper references to factory sales
or outlets, and so forth. This, in turn, calls for competence in knowing how to identify and discover evidence of these practices. This
sort of competence is developed holistically. It calls for familiarity
with the market for consumer goods as it operates in California; a
sense of the perspective of the general public and the susceptibilities of credulous or ignorant members of it; knowledge of the numerous channels for advertising; awareness of the ways both lawful
17.
18.
19.

Id. § 1309.2.
Id. § 1310.
Id. § 1312.

Duquesne Law Review

134

Vol. 56

and unlawful ads communicate and lawful and unlawful sellers operate; detailed knowledge of the purpose, history, and content of
relevant statutes and regulations; and a grasp of how administrative boards and courts apply them. But it does not necessitate contentious claims about the mental states of those who are in violation.
III.

PARALLELS BETWEEN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND MODERN MARKETS

The general populace parallels consumers, and elected officials
and candidates for elected office parallel purveyors of consumer
goods. As in the market for consumer goods, politicians and voters
have limited opportunity for the sort of repeated face-to-face personal interaction in which people can best deploy commonsense
methods for evaluating truthfulness. Because of the size of the population, the distances between capitals and home districts and
states, and the fact that voters have many concerns other than politics, politicians-like sellers-can use mendacity to persuade voters to support them or at least refuse support to their rivals. This
is true not just in regard to elections, but with regard to policies
pursued and decisions taken by elected officials. Mendacity about
these can provoke public support or opposition. Whether seeking
office or already in it, politicians can have various motives to be
mendacious in their communications to the general public-ranging from raw desire for power, to a need to curry favor with certain
special interest groups, to a dedication to implementing an overall
agenda.
Consumer goods markets and democratic politics both are mechanisms for aligning social results with individual choices-for mediating what is on the market at what price; who occupies elected
office; and what laws and policies government pursues. You need
not glorify the role of individual choice in life, nor think that either
politics or markets work perfectly, to appreciate the value of mechanisms that protect individuals whose choices would unlikely be respected or vindicated by alternative methods, whether for production and distribution of goods or for who serves in government and
what government does. But for this sort of thing to work even
roughly, the mechanism that aligns individual choices with social
results must reflect minimally meaningful choices made by the relevant individuals. Individual choices based on inaccurate information are not meaningful indicators of what the choosers favor,
want, need, or care about. When a politician supplies inaccurate
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information to the public to further a politician's own objectives, he
manipulates and exploits those whose choices he is supposed to represent. If the mendacity of politicians becomes pervasive, democratic government loses the very basis for representation: the separateness of the public interest from the politician's own goals.
Mendaciousness makes it possible for politicians to coopt representative democracy for purposes other than popular self-governance.
Potential voters who come to believe that voting itself has become
a mechanism for oppression are unlikely to flock to the polls. This
is another way mendacity from politicians threatens large-scale
representative democracy, which is premised on the existence of a
connection, forged by the ballot, between the general populace and
those who serve in governmental office. If large numbers of people
refrain from voting, no such connection is possible.
So, contemporary American representative democracy in some
ways resembles modern markets for consumer goods and is thus
similarly susceptible to erosion via mendacity. But as with untruthfulness in markets, not all untruthfulness in politics is equally
pernicious. In both settings, hype, for example, can attract attention without hoodwinking. When politicians exaggerate or oversimplify, their mendacity is not necessarily harmful. American representative democracy is safe from some measure of hyperbole or bromide. How can the public know when mendacity menaces? Here is
where lawyers can be useful. Lawyers can deploy their expertise in
parsing unproblematic mendacity from pernicious mendacity. They
can examine politicians and identify patterns and practices of mendacity that strike at the essential components of representative democracy.
IV.

LAWYERS SHOULD AID THE PUBLIC IN IDENTIFYING AND
CONDEMNING PERNICIOUS MENDACITY

In the United States, the legal profession stands in a special relationship to representative democracy, popular sovereignty, and
the rule of law-and thus the profession has responsibilities to protect these from pernicious mendacity in politics. The slogan "no one
is above the law" is a motto for democracies founded on popular sovereignty. If politics in a representative democracy is to function
properly, laws must be creditable as laws in the interest of the populace. They cannot be vehicles for personal gain or raw power.
When politicians are systematically mendacious, the laws they
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make and the policies they propose are suspect. They put the rule
of law in doubt.
All members of a representative democracy founded in popular
democracy have an interest in and arguably some obligation to
maintain the health of democratic institutions and political discourse. But lawyers have a custodial role to play, by virtue of their
expertise and by the way they themselves particularly benefit from
a system of governance premised on rule of law. 20
Part of why the legal profession is so prominent in American culture, and why it provides a living and social standing for so many
who enter it, is precisely because the country is one of laws, not
people. It takes a lot of law to substitute for personal decree and
whim or extralegal social control. That law has to be written, argued for, explained, used, modified, adapted, improved. This is all
work done by lawyers, who make their livings this way. In a country less law-governed, lawyers' work would be less valuable and less
valued. Lawyers have a concrete, material interest in preserving
the rule of law. As particular financial beneficiaries of this system
of governance, lawyers owe it to their fellow citizens to protect the
rule of law and thereby preserve representative democracy.
Lawyers' educations give them a particular ability to anticipate
when and how mendacity can undo a practice that serves a desirable social purpose. Lawyers are schooled in how mendacity can endanger the quality and even the existence of socially beneficial institutions. Their awareness of this kind of threat and their skills in
dealing with it make them similar to doctors in emergency health
situations. Confronted with an emergency, even a specialist who
does not ordinarily deal with the particular medical problem presented should provide assistance. If the emergency is epidemic, not
only individual physicians should help-so should hospitals and
medical professional organizations. Similarly, law firms, legal organizations, and lawyers' professional organizations may have obligations to address pernicious political mendacity, particularly if it
is pervasive.
V.

CONCLUSION

I started by noting Donald Trump's extreme mendacity compared
to other politicians'. Trump currently serves in the Executive Office

20. This line of argument will be familiar to scholars and practitioners of tort law. In
that context, it is used to justify the imposition of legal duties of care, whereas here, I am
arguing that lawyers have an ethical duty to protect against pervasive mendacity in American politics.
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of President of the United States. For many Americans, he is the
politician they most often see and hear, via his own rallies, Twitter,
and press reports. In all these venues, Trump repeatedly speaks
mendaciously. While particular instances are more or less egregious departures from truthfulness, it is the fact that Trump has
incorporated mendacity into his political brand, as it were, that
makes his mendacity so dangerous. By repeatedly and constantly
dissembling, lying, telling half-truths, and denying facts, Trump
epitomizes the mendacious politician. As President, he is the most
salient example of a politician many people have. If the most salient politician is also an exemplar of mendacity, people may well
conclude he is typical, that all politicians are similarly mendacious.
This can erode people's willingness to participate in representative
democracy, as I explained above. If Trump's baked-in mendacity
becomes a trend among politicians, representativeness itself becomes impossible: a populace whose votes have been mendaciously
manipulated by the beneficiary of those votes has not in any way
expressed its own authentic will. Nobody elected on such a basis
can be seen as representing an aggregation of the populace's
choices, since the members of the populace did not, in fact, make a
real choice. Rather, they went through the motions of voting but
did so on the basis of mendacity that voided the significance of the
votes they cast.
Pernicious mendacity in politics is not limited to Donald Trump.
Lawyers should be examining mendacity from other politicians to
decide whether it is harmful to the rule of law and representative
democracy. Sometimes, it will make more sense to analyze political
speech not through an analogy to false and misleading advertising,
but through other legal frameworks that preserve practices vulnerable to mendacity. For example, lawyers who specialize in contracts
law, particularly contracts between merchants, will be aware of
how the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) addresses the problem
of truthfulness in warranties. On one hand, the U.C.C. does not
want to write merchants' contracts for them. Merchants are presumed to be sophisticated at contracting and are therefore best left
to formulate the terms of their own agreements. On the other hand,
even sophisticated transactors face versions of the collective action
problem generated by the combination of self-interest and credulity
that arises in social activities. The U.C.C. drills down on a particular locus in bargains between merchants, a locus where the temptation to mendacity is high as is the overall benefit of blocking it:
affirmations of fact merchants make about the goods they are pur-
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veying, otherwise known as express warranties. An express warranty is an extra commitment from buyer to seller that a good will
live up to agreed-upon specifications. One can see how this would
add value to a contract and how easily a purchaser could be exploited via a mendacious express warranty.
The U.C.C. handles the problem by distinguishing promises
about goods into two categories, implied and express. Implied warranties go without saying, so to speak. 21 These are representations
about goods every buyer and seller can assume the seller is making
and are restricted to guarantees of merchantability 22 and fitness. 23
The exact scope and content of these warranties is defined by trade
practices. By giving them default status, the U.C.C. underwrites
implicit representations about the quality of goods being sold.
Beyond merchantability and fitness, any other guarantees about
goods must be explicit and are themselves part of what the U.C.C.
takes the parties to be bargaining over.24 In calling for terms to be
expressed, the U.C.C. does not confine merchants to linguistic
agreements. The U.C.C. specifically recognizes that sellers of goods
may affirm facts about goods via exhibition of samples or use of
technical specifications or blueprints, for example. Nor does the
U.C.C. suggest that affirmations of fact are to be ascertained by an
inquiry into the intentional state of a seller who conveys. What
matters is whether a description of a good or the exhibition of a
sample was a basis for the agreement to purchase the goods. If so,
that description is itself part of the "fabric of the agreement." As
such, it can be the subject of claims for breach of contract. Of
course, whether a description, linguistic or otherwise, actually constitutes an affirmation of fact that is essential to the entire bargain
can be, factually, quite a complicated matter. My point is not that
the U.C.C. provisions on express warranties make all cases easy.
Rather, my point is that these U.C.C. provisions approach the entire issue of accuracy of information in a very particular contextthe mercantile one, where all parties are assumed and expected to
21. "'Implied' warranties rest so clearly on a common factual situation or set of conditions
that no particular language or action is necessary to evidence them and they will arise in
such a situation unless unmistakably negated." U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 1 (AM LAW INST. & NAT'L
CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2018).
22. Under the U.C.C.'s definition of "merchantability," goods must be at least of average
quality, properly packaged and labeled, and fit for the ordinary purposes they are intended

to serve. Id.

§ 2-315.

23. Fitness refers to a seller's knowledge that a buyer is going to use goods for a particular purpose, and that the buyer is relying on the seller's expertise in order to select suitable

goods. Id.
24. See id. § 2-313 cmt. 1 (Specific affirmations of act must be expressed because these
go to the "essence of the bargain" that is the very product of the parties' "dickering.").
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be sophisticated about the nature and purpose of their communications.
There are political settings that are more like the one regulated
by the U.C.C. than the one regulated by California's law and regulation on false and misleading advertising. Examples might include
when officials make representations on background checks for security clearances or when nominees for high office address questions at confirmation hearings. These are more special purpose and
ritualized areas of communication, and like bargains between merchants, it may make sense to hold people accountable for both implied and express affirmations they make.
Lawyers from all sorts of specialties have experience and
knowledge related to the sort of mendacity that can wreck socially
beneficial practices and institutions. They can and should use their
professional education and skills to inform their fellow citizens of
pernicious mendacity in politics. 25 I am not maintaining that courts

or legislatures should regulate mendacity in political speech, not
arguing for the creation of a body of law on the topic. Rather, I urge
that lawyers and the institutions associated with the profession
have civic work to do.

25. Some lawyers are already showing the way. Walter Shaub, former director of the
United States Office of Government Ethics, joined Campaign Legal Center as Senior Director, Ethics in July 2017. Shaub regularly uses Twitter to unpack lying on federal forms, such
as the one used to apply for national security clearances.
See, e.g., Walter Shaub
(@waltshaub), TWITTER (Dec. 11, 2017, 8:19 AM), https://mobile.twitter.com/waltshaub/status/940254666113404929 ("New! Below is the email from the FBI regarding Session's claim
that he was told not to disclose foreign contacts. This email does not corroborate the DOJ's
explanation, which was that he got advice from FBI'In filling out the SF-86 form."'). Renato
Mariotti, now in private practice and running for Attorney General of Illinois, also uses Twitter to examine lies related to the ongoing FBI investigation into Russian influence on the
2016 U.S. presidential elections. See, e.g., Renato Mariotti (@renato-mariotti), TWITTER
(Nov.
1,
2017,
6:41
PM),
https://mobile.twitter.com/renatomariotti/status/925900578672332800 ("THREAD: Is the President of the United States under investigation?"). Stephen J. Harper, a lawyer who has authored several books and serves as an adjunct professor at Northwestern University Law Center, dissects lies from Trump, Pence,
Jared Kushner, and others as part of an interactive timeline related to the various investigations into connections between the Trump administration and Russia. Interactive Timeline: Everything We Know About Russia and President Trump, MOYERS & Co., http://billmoyers.com/story/trump-russia-timeline/ (last updated Feb. 27, 2018).

